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ABSTRACT
In this study, we prove that the strategic interaction among agents differing in initial wealth levels
leads the poor to be able to catch up with the rich, which is not the case for the standard Ramsey
model where the initial wealth differences perpetuate. Extending the analysis to account for relative
wealth concern and the adjustment cost of consumption, the strategic interaction among agents is
shown to affect not only the distribution of wealth in the long run but also the transitional dynamics
substantially. In particular, we show that structurally very simple frameworks may lead to limit
cycles thanks to the strategic interaction among agents in the economy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The question of catching-up has always been one of the main concerns of macroeconomics.
Stiglitz (1969) has shown that the poor will be able to catch up with the rich in a Solow
economy. This analysis rests on the assumption that agents do not save optimally. In contrast
with this, in a dynamic general equilibrium model à la Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans, Kemp and
Shimomura (1992) has shown that if all households have the same time-preference rate, then the
distribution of wealth will be history dependent so that the initial wealth inequality will persist
even in the long run. However, in all of these studies, agents are thought to have no power in
influencing the performance of aggregate economy and act as a price taker on all markets in
a competitive equilibrium. Knowing that the number of households is finite, this contradicts
with the rationality of the agents in the economy (see Pichler and Sorger, 2009). Moreover,
the fact that social or economic similarities enforce individuals to constitute a small number of
powerful groups and agents belonging to the same economic classes show similar tendencies
in choosing their decision variables, makes the consideration of the strategic interaction among
agents inevitable.1
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1Thanks to the comment of an anonymous referee, consider as an example the labor owned enterprises in
accordance with the Action Programme (1989) of the European Commission (see Guadona, 2008). Given
their limited number and heterogeneity in terms of initial asset and share holdings, workers that own a share
of the firm may realize their market power and act strategically in choosing their capital paths. Also for
the emerging recognition of strategic interaction in growth theory, see among others, Fershtman and Muller
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The objective of this paper is to analyze how the dynamic strategic interactions among agents
affect the long-run distribution of wealth in terms of catching up and the transitional dynamics in
an economy. In particular, we analyze to what extent the strategic interaction inherent in agents’
strategies can alter the results on catching up that could have emerged under a competitive
equilibrium framework and try to answer the following questions: Can a rich household with
a larger initial stock credibly maintain this advantage to preempt the rival’s accumulation and
reach a better long-run stock of capital? Put differently, can this kind of initial advantage vanish
in the non-cooperative equilibrium of this class of games even with open-loop strategies?
To do so, we consider a strategic Ramsey model in which finitely many households differ
only in terms of their initial wealth. The households no longer act as price-takers but they take
into account the effects of their accumulation decisions on market prices. Taking into account
the inverse factor demand functions, the households play a Nash equilibrium by choosing their
capital paths. We assume that the households employ open-loop strategies so that they give
their accumulation decisions as simple time paths and commit themselves to stick to these
preannounced paths as equilibrium strategies (see e.g. Sorger, 2002, 2008; Bethmann, 2008).
In this setup, households choose their strategies simultaneously and each household is faced
with a single criterion optimization problem constrained by the strategies of the rivals taken
as given. In this respect, adopting open-loop strategies reflect the slightest departure from the
competitive equilibrium framework as it does not allow for genuine interaction between players
during the game (see Sorger, 2008; Camacho et al., 2013). However, even under this small
departure from the competitive equilibrium framework, we show that considering the strategic
interaction among agents in the economy changes the qualitative properties of the standard
Ramsey model drastically.2
In the absence of strategic interaction, the poor will never be able to catch up with the
rich as pointed out in Van Long and Shimomura (2004). However, incorporating the strategic
behavior among agents leads to the wealth level of the initially poor and the rich households
to be the same at the stationary state. We extend our analysis on the dynamic implications of
strategic interaction, to account for relative wealth concern (capitalist spirit3) and adjustment
cost of consumption on utility. Deviating from the competitive equilibrium framework, we
show that the strategic interaction among agents in the economy leads to a change not only
in the distribution of wealth in the long run but also in the transitional dynamics substantially.
Indeed, the strategic interaction not only leads to complex wealth distribution but also complex
dynamics in Ramsey model with adjustment cost of consumption. The importance of these
results is further emphasized if one recalls that the peculiar possibility of cyclical policies
requires both extensions of the Ramsey model, a positive spillover of capital in utility and the
adjustment costs of consumption (see Wirl, 1994; Wirl et al., 2008). However, we show that
when households use open-loop strategies rather than being price takers, complex dynamics
may emerge even without capital in utility at very low levels of adjustment costs. In this respect,
we show that structurally very simple frameworks may lead to limit cycles thanks to the strategic
interaction among agents in the economy.
(1984), Figueres et al. (1999), Dockner and Nishimura (2005) on capital accumulation games; Espino
(2005), Bethmann (2008) on Lucas-Uzawa model; Sorger (2008) on Ramsey conjecture and Camacho,
et al. (2013) on dynamics.
2Sorger (2008) proposes a strategic Ramsey model in which agents differ in their subjective time discount
rate and analyzes Ramsey conjecture on the degeneracy of the long-run distribution of wealth. However, we
assume that agents differ only in their initial wealth and analyze whether the poor can catch up with rich in
the long run.
3Capitalist spirit refers to the motivation behind the perpetual acquisition of wealth not only for the sake
of maximizing long-run consumption but also for the utility from accumulating wealth itself and the status
associated with it (see Weber, 1958; Bakshi and Chen, 1996; Corneo and Jeanne, 1997).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the model and provides
the dynamic properties of competitive and open-loop Nash equilibrium. Section III and IV
consider the relative wealth concern and the adjustment costs of consumption, respectively.
Finally, Section V concludes.
II. MODEL
We consider a Ramsey (1928) economy with N ∈ N infinitely lived households and a represen-
tative firm. The firm hires capital K (t) and labor L(t) from the households and produces a single
output Y (t) that can be either consumed or saved to form future capital. The technology is repre-
sented by a neoclassical production function F : R2+ → R+. At any instant t, the firm chooses
the variables Y (t), K (t), and L(t) to maximize the profit Y (t) − w(t)L(t) − r (t)K (t) subject
to the technology Y (t) = F(K (t), L(t)) and the nonnegativity constraints K (t) ≥ 0, L(t) ≥ 0
where w(t) is the real wage rate and r (t) is the rental rate of capital.
The preferences of household i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } are characterized by the instantaneous utility
function u : R+ → R and the time preference rate ρ > 0. At any instant t, every household sup-
ply inelastically one unit of labor so that the total labor supply is N . Let f (K (t)) = F(K (t), N ).
We assume that f and u satisfy the following properties.
Assumption 1. f : R+ → R+, is continuous, twice continuously differentiable, strictly in-
creasing, strictly concave satisfying f (0) = 0, limK→0 f ′(K ) = +∞ and limK→+∞ f ′(K ) =
0.
Assumption 2. u : R+ → R, is continuous, twice continuously differentiable, strictly in-
creasing, strictly concave satisfying limc→0 u ′(c) = +∞.
The households differ only in terms of their initial wealth levels. Agents maximize their
discounted lifetime utility derived from the consumption of the single good. The utility maxi-





e−ρt u(ci (t))dt (P)
subject to
·
ki (t) = r (t)ki (t) + w(t) − ci (t),∀t ≥ 0,
ki (t) ≥ 0, ci (t) ≥ 0,∀t ≥ 0,
ki (0) = ki0, given.
In what follows, we will analyze the competitive equilibrium and the open-loop Nash equilibrium
in order to identify to what extent the strategic interaction among agents in the economy affects
the long run distribution of wealth in terms of catching-up.
II.1 Competitive equilibrium
If we assume that the households are price-takers so that they can not realize their market power
and take the rental rates of capital and labor as given, the model coincides with the standard
Ramsey economy. Kemp and Shimomura (1992) and Van Long and Shimomura (2004) have
already shown that the initial wealth inequality will persist in the long run so that the poor
individuals will never be able to catch up with the rich in such a framework. For completeness
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and providing a basis of comparison, the analysis of competitive equilibrium follows from their
studies.
The solution to the utility maximization problem (P) of household i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } leads to




= β (ci (t)) (r (t) − ρ) ,
where β(ci ) ≡ − u′(ci )ci u′′(ci ) denotes the inverse of the elasticity of marginal utility.
Since the firm maximizes its profit taking the market prices as given, factors are paid their
marginal products, i.e.,




,∀t ≥ 0, (1)
where K (t) = ∑Ni=1 ki (t). We have then the following system of 2N differential equations:
·
ki (t) = f ′ (K (t)) ki (t) + f (K (t)) − K (t) f
′(K (t))
N




= β (ci (t)) ( f ′(K (t)) − ρ) ,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } . (3)
A steady state is defined by (ki , ci ) such that the right-hand sides of the system of equations
(2)–(3) equal to zero for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } . A steady state is said to be symmetric if ki = k,
and ci = c, for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } . A steady state turns out to be asymmetric if ki 
= k j ,
for some i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } . The following proposition shows that if ki (0) 
= k j (0) for some
i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } then we will have ki 
= k j at the steady state.
Proposition 1. We have ki = k, for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } at the steady state if and only if
the initial wealth levels are identical, i.e., ki (0) = k0, for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }. Moreover,
there exists a continuum of steady state wealth distributions and a corresponding continuum
of one-dimensional stable manifolds so that inequalities persist.
Proof. Follows directly from Kemp and Shimomura (1992) and Van Long and Shimomura
(2004). 
II.2 Strategic Ramsey model and open loop Nash equilibrium
Agents no longer act as price-takers but they take into account the effects of their accumulation
decisions on market prices. Taking into account the inverse factor demand functions stated in
(1), the households play a Nash equilibrium by choosing their capital paths. Households give
their accumulation decisions as simple time paths and commit themselves to stick to these time
paths during the entire game (i.e., they employ open-loop strategies). When choosing its path
of capital, household i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } takes the other households’ choice variables as given.





e−ρt u(ci (t))dt (P ′)
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subject to
·
ki (t) = f ′(K (t))ki (t) + f (K (t)) − K (t) f
′(K (t))
N
− ci (t),∀t ≥ 0,
ki (t) ≥ 0, ci (t) ≥ 0,∀t ≥ 0,
ki (0) = ki0, given,
k j (t),∀t ≥ 0,∀ j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } \ {i} , given.
It is important to note that household i takes into account that it can influence K (t) via ki (t) as
K (t) = ∑Nj=1 k j (t). The Hamiltonian for problem P ′ is:
H (ci (t), ki (t), λi (t)) = e−ρt u(ci (t)) +
λi (t)
(






The set of necessary conditions of optimality will then be written as follows: ∀i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , N } ,∀t ≥ 0,





= f ′(K (t)) + f ′′(K (t))
(





ki (t) = f ′(K (t))ki (t) + f (K (t)) − K (t) f
′(K (t))
N
− ci (t). (6)
In order to make the first order optimality conditions for P ′ to be sufficient, we need to assume
further that the factor income of each household is a concave function of its own capital stock.
Assumption 3. The function ki (t) → ki (t) f ′(K (t)) is concave for all i ∈ {1, . . . ., N } and
for all t ≥ 0.
Under Assumptions 1-3, the first order optimality conditions are also sufficient if the
transversality condition limt→0 λi (t)ki (t) = 0 holds for all i ∈ {1, . . . ., N }. In accordance with
Assumption 2, we adopt a C R R A form of utility function with an intertemporal elasticity
of substitution θ under which we obtain the following system of 2N differential equations:









(K (t)) − ρ + f ′′(K (t))
(









− ci (t). (8)
In the following proposition, taking into account the strategic interaction among agents, we
show that the catching up prevails in the economy, so that even if the agents have initially
different levels of wealth, they will eventually reach equal levels of wealth at the steady state.
Proposition 2. In an open-loop Nash equilibrium, there exists a unique symmetric steady
state and there are no asymmetric steady states.
Proof. Note from (B) that we have
f
′





= 0,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }
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at a steady state. Since the production function is strictly concave, i.e., f
′
(K ) > 0, f ′′(K ) < 0,
the condition that satisfies these N equations simultaneously is simply ki = k, for all i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , N } . 
II.3 Steady state and the stability analysis
We now examine the stability properties of the symmetric steady state at which we have
f ′(K ) = ρ, ci = f (K )N , ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }, where K = Nki . Linearizing the system of 2N







. . . . . . . . . . . .
−IN×N
... f ′(K )IN×N
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
where I and 0 denote the identity and zero matrix respectively and
AN×N = 1
θN





) (1 − 1
N





) (2 − 1
N









) (1 − 1
N





Note that AN×N is a symmetric Toeplitz (diagonal-constant) matrix with (N − 1) charac-
teristic roots that are equal to 1
θN
f (K ) f ′′(K ) and one characteristic root that is equal to
1
θ
f (K ) f ′′(K ). Without loss of generality, let μ1 = μ2 = . . . = μN−1 = 1θN f (K ) f ′′(K ) and
μN = 1θ f (K ) f ′′(K ). As f ′′(K ) < 0, we have μi < 0,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } .
To find the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix J,we need to solve det[J − λI] = 0. However,
note that λ is an eigenvalue of the jacobian matrix J if and only if λ( f ′(K ) − λ) is an eigenvalue
of AN×N as
det[J − λI] = det [A − λ ( f ′(K ) − λ) I] .
This simply suggests that the eigenvalues of the 2N × 2N Jacobian matrix can easily be
characterized by the characteristic root distribution of AN×N . Indeed, the eigenvalues of the
Jacobian matrix J will be determined as a solution to the quadratic equations,
λ2 − f ′(K )λ+ μi = 0,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } .
In particular, for each eigenvalue μi of matrix A, this equation has two roots, the product of
which isμi < 0. Evidently, this implies that the Jacobian matrix J has N positive and N negative
real eigenvalues so that the symmetric steady state turns out to be stable in the saddle-point
sense.
III. RELATIVE WEALTH EFFECT IN STRATEGIC RAMSEY MODEL
Accepting that wealth is more valuable than its implied consumption rewards, Van Long and
Shimomura (2004) consider that the agents get utility not only from their consumption stream
but also from their relative wealth level with respect to the average in the economy. Thanks to
this relative wealth effect in utility, Van Long and Shimomura (2004) show that the poor will be
able to catch up with the rich if the elasticity of the marginal utility of relative wealth is greater
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than the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. However, even though the agents take
care of their relative wealth position in the economy so that the strategic interaction among
agents inherently exists, this has not been taken into account in assessing the conclusions on
catching up.
The model differs from the strategic Ramsey model by the assumption on the preference of
the agents. In this set up, households take utility not only from their consumption but also from
their social status represented by their relative wealth. The maximization problem of household





e−ρt (u(ci (t)) + ηi v (zi (t))) dt (P ′′)
subject to
·
ki (t) = f ′(K (t))ki (t) + f (K (t)) − K (t) f
′(K (t))
N
− ci (t),∀t ≥ 0,
zi (t) = ki (t)K (t)
N
,∀t ≥ 0,
ki (t) ≥ 0, ci (t) ≥ 0,∀t ≥ 0,
ki (0) = ki0, given,
k j (t),∀t ≥ 0,∀ j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } \ {i} , given,
where zi refers to the relative wealth of household i with respect to the average wealth in the
economy. ηi ∈ R+ measures the weight of relative wealth (status concern) in utility. We employ
an additively separable utility function between consumption and realtive wealth not only for
analytical convenience but also for being consistent with Van Long and Shimomura (2004) and
the recent empirical findings.4 We adopt the following assumption on the utility from relative
wealth.
Assumption 4. v : R+ → R, is continuous, twice continuously differentiable, strictly in-
creasing, strictly concave satisfying v(0) = 0 and limz→0 v ′(z) = +∞.
The current-value Hamiltonian associated with optimization problem P ′′ is
H(ci (t), ki (t), λi (t)) =
[



















where λi denotes the current-value adjoint variable. Recall that household i takes into ac-
count that it can influence K (t) via ki (t) as K (t) =
∑N
j=1 k j (t). A routine application of the
Pontryagin’s maximum principle leads to the following system of 2N differential equations:
∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } ,∀t ≥ 0,
.




f ′(K (t)) − ρ + f ′′(K (t))
(













4Compared to the multiplicative form, the separable form of the preferences is more consistent with
the empirical findings on the behavior of the wealthy households since these preferences do not put any
restrictions on either the substitutability or the complementarity between consumption and relative wealth
(see Francis (2009) for details about the functional form of the utility function).
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.
ki (t) = f ′(K (t))ki (t) +
f (K (t)) − K (t) f ′(K (t))
N
−ci (t). (10)
Under Assumptions 1-4, the first order optimality conditions are also sufficient if the transver-
sality condition limt→0 e−ρtλi (t)ki (t) = 0 holds for all i ∈ {1, . . . ., N }.
Taking into account the strategic interaction among agents, we now consider the conditions
under which catching up will prevail in the economy. It is clear from equations (9)–(10) that
ηi = η for all i ∈ {1, . . . ., N } turns out to be a necessary condition for the existence of a
symmetric steady state. Indeed, given ηi = η, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ., N } , a symmetric steady state
exists if and only if there exists K > 0 such that
f ′(K ) + η1 v
′(1)






In accordance with Assumption 2 and 4, adopting C R R A form of utility functions, u(c) =
c1−θ
1−θ and v(z) = z
1−σ
1−σ , and the standard Cobb-Douglas production function f (K ) = AK γ , γ ∈
(0, 1), the following proposition provides the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a
symmetric steady state.
Proposition 3. Let ηi = η, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ., N } . There exists a unique symmetric steady
state if γ θ < 1. Moreover, if θ ≤ σ then an asymmetric steady state does not exist.
Proof. See Van Long and Shimomura (2004) for the existence and the uniqueness of a symmet-
ric steady state. The proof of the existence of a symmetric steady state follows from the limit
properties of the left-hand side of equation (11). Given existence, if [K u ′( f (K ))] is monotoni-
cally decreasing in K then the uniqueness of the symmetric steady state is also ensured.
Assume now that there exists an asymmetric steady state at which ki > k j , for some i, j ∈
{1, . . . ., N }, without loss of generality. Let ci and c j denote the associated consumption levels
at this asymmetric steady state. It is then clear from (9) and (10) that
f ′′(K )(ki − k j ) = Nη
K 2
(
v ′(z j )
u ′(c j )
(
K − k j
)− v ′(zi )
u ′(ci )
(K − ki )
)
. (12)
Note that the left-hand side of (12) is less than zero due to the concavity of the production































so that the right-hand side of (12) is positive: a contradiction. 
If initially poor households attribute less weight to the relative wealth (status concern) in
utility than the initially rich households, then the poor can never catch up with the rich in such
a strategic Ramsey economy. Note that, as we focus on catching up, we need also the condition
that the elasticity of consumption is less than that of relative wealth for avoiding the emergence
of the asymmetric steady states. Moreover, we also need to verify that the unique symmetric
steady state turns out to be stable at least in the saddle-point sense.
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To do so, we characterize the Jacobian of the resulting 2N × 2N system associated with (III)
around a symmetric steady state (ci , ki )i∈{1,....,N } at which ηi = η, ci = c = f (K )N , ki = k for all




(ρ − f ′(K )) IN×N
... BN×N
. . . . . . . . . . . .
−IN×N







a b · · · b
b a
. . . b
...
. . .
. . . b
b · · · b a
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,
is a symmetric Toeplitz (diagonal-constant) matrix with (N − 1) characteristic roots that are










































det[J − λI] = det [B− (λ− f ′(K )) (ρ − f ′(K ) − λ) I] ,
the eigenvalues of the 2N × 2N Jacobian matrix can easily be characterized by the characteristic
roots μi , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } of BN×N . Indeed, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix J will be
determined as a solution to the quadratic equations,














v ′(1) − 1N−1
))









, i = N .
In particular, for each eigenvalue μi of matrix B, this equation has two roots, the product of
which equals to ( f ′(K )(ρ − f ′(K )) + μi ). Recalling that γ θ < 1, θ ≤ σ, and we have (11) at a
unique symmetric steady state, one can easily show that the product of the two roots is less than
zero. This implies that the Jacobian matrix J has N positive and N negative real eigenvalues
which reveals saddle path stability with monotone convergence.
It is already clear that, the long run distribution of wealth heavily depends on the valuation
of the relative position by the initially poor and the rich households. Indeed, as soon as ηi
differs from η j for some i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }, the strategic Ramsey model with relative wealth
concern would result with a complex wealth distribution characterized by a saddle path stable
asymmetric steady state. The next section is devoted to the analysis of the strategic Ramsey
model with adjustment costs of consumption under which not only complex wealth distribution
but also complex dynamics may emerge.
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IV. ADJUSTMENT COST OF CONSUMPTION IN STRATEGIC RAMSEY MODEL
The strategic Ramsey model is now extended for considering the dynamic implications of con-
sumption adjustment costs by assuming that the agents not only derive utility from consumption
but also incur a disutility from the adjustments of consumption. Accordingly, the problem of





e−ρt{u(ci (t)) −	(κi (t))}dt (P ′′′)
subject to
.




− ci (t),∀t ≥ 0,
.
ci (t) = κi (t),∀t ≥ 0,
ki (t) ≥ 0, ci (t) ≥ 0,∀t ≥ 0,
ki (0) = ki0, given,
k j (t),∀t ≥ 0,∀ j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } \ {i} , given.
The additional state equation and the account for the adjustment costs (	(κi (t))) constitute an
important extension to the strategic Ramsey model. We adopt the following assumption on the
adjustment cost function.
Assumption 5. 	 : R → R, is continuous, twice continuously differentiable, strictly increas-
ing, strictly convex and 	′(.) is invertible.
The current-value Hamiltonian associated with the optimization problem P ′′′ writes as











+ μi (t)κi (t).
The application of the Pontryagin’s maximum principle leads to the following system of 4N
differential equations: ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } ,∀t ≥ 0,
.
μi (t) = μi (t)ρ + λi (t) − U ′(ci (t)), (13)
.








ci (t) =  (μi (t)) , (15)
.




− ci (t), (16)
where (ki (t)) = f ′′(K (t))(ki (t)− K (t)N ). Note from (15) that 
′
(μi (t)) = 1	′′ (κi (t)) by the implicit
function theorem.5 Under Assumptions 1-5, the first order optimality conditions are not only
necessary but also sufficient if the transversality conditions, limt→0 e−ρtλi (t)ki (t) = 0, and
limt→0 e−ρtμi (t)ci (t) = 0 hold for all i ∈ {1, . . . ., N }.
5μi (t) = 	′(κi (t)) and as 	′(.) is invertable, then(μi (t)) = κi (t). Thus, 	′((μi (t))) − μi (t) = 0. The
first derivative will give the result.
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A steady state is defined by (μi , λi , ki , ci ) such that the right-hand sides of the system of dif-
ferential equations (13)–(16) equal to zero for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } . The following proposition
is devoted to the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric steady state.
Proposition 4. There exists a unique symmetric steady state and there are no asymmet-
ric steady states in the strategic Ramsey model augmented with the adjustment cost of
consumption.
Proof. Note from (14) that
.
λi (t) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ., N } if and only if (ki ) =
ρ − f ′(K ), for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }. We have then f ′′(K )(ki− KN ) = f ′′(K )(k j− KN ) for all
i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } , i 
= j. As f ′′ < 0, this implies ki = KN , for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } so that
the emergence of an asymmetric steady state is ruled out. The existence of a unique symmetric
steady state then follows easily from the monotonicity and the limit properties of the right-hand
side of equation (14). 
It is important to note that the model with adjustment cost of consumption reduces to the
standard Ramsey model at the steady state thanks to the price taking assumption of the com-
petitive equilibrium. Because of this, the qualitative properties of the competitive equilibrium
of the standard Ramsey model will be carried over to the Ramsey model augmented with the
Easterlin hypothesis. Accordingly, as Van Long and Shimomura (2004) have shown for the
standard Ramsey model, there exists a continuum of steady state wealth distributions and a cor-
responding continuum of one-dimensional stable manifolds in the Ramsey model augmented
with consumption adjustment costs. In other words, the Ramsey model augmented with con-
sumption adjustment costs predicts that the initial wealth differences will continue to persist in
a competitive equilibrium environment.
However, to what extent the qualitative features of the strategic Ramsey model will carry over
to the strategic Ramsey model with adjustment cost of consumption is not yet clear. Even though,
we show that there exists a symmetric steady state, we need to analyze the dynamic properties
of the associated system as well. The next section presents that the strategic interaction may
induce cycles à la Hopf in the strategic Ramsey model with consumption adjustment costs.
IV.1 Hopf bifurcation and Easterlin cycles
The analysis follows from Guckenheimer et al. (1997) that serves procedures for locating
Hopf bifurcations in any n−dimensional system of ordinary differential equations based on the
singularity of matrices stemming from algebraic transformations of the Jacobian at a steady
state.
In what follows, for the sake of dimensional simplicity, we consider an economy with N = 2
households which differ in terms of initial level of capital stock. Recall from the system of
differential equations (13)-(16) that we have now a system of eight differential equations in
terms of capital and consumption levels of the poor and the rich household. Let J denote the
Jacobian of this system of equations around the unique symmetric steady state (c∗, k∗, λ∗, μ∗)
and let p(ω) be the associated characteristic polynomial so that
p (ω) = a0 + a1ω + a2ω2 + · · · · · · + a7ω7 + a8ω8.
p(ω) has the non-zero root pair {ω,−ω} if and only if ω is a common root of the two equations
p(ω) + p(−ω) = 0 and p(ω) − p(−ω) = 0. Substituting z = ω2, construct two new polyno-
mials:
re(z) = a0 + a2z + a4z2 + a6z3 + z4, (17)
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ro(z) = a1 + a3z + a5z2 + a7z3. (18)





= 0. Let the




a0 a2 a4 a6 1 0 0
0 a0 a2 a4 a6 1 0
0 0 a0 a2 a4 a6 1
a1 a3 a5 a7 0 0 0
0 a1 a3 a5 a7 0 0
0 0 a1 a3 a5 a7 0
0 0 0 a1 a3 a5 a7
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
For m ∈ {0, 1} , let Sm denote the matrix obtained from S by deleting the rows 1 and 4 and the
columns 1 and m + 2. By means of the relation between the characteristic polynomial and its
corresponding matrices S, S0, S1, Guckenheimer, et al. (1996) provides the following result.
Theorem 1. (Guckenheimer et al., 1997) Let S be the Sylvester matrix for polynomials
re and ro. Then J has precisely one pair of pure imaginary eigenvalues if det[S] = 0 and
det[S0] det[S1] > 0. If det[S] 
= 0 or det[S0] det[S1] < 0, then p(ω) has no purely imaginary
roots.
This procedure for locating Hopf bifurcations is specifically designed to locate points at
which a simple pair of pure imaginary eigenvalues for the Jacobian of the system. When the
conditions of the Theorem 1 are satisfied, the magnitudex of the shared root,
√
det[S1]/ det[S0]
can be easily related to the period of the limit cycle created at the Hopf bifurcation point.
Then the main task is to show a parameter constellation under which the implementation of
Theorem 1 yields a pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues. To do so, we adopt the standard Cobb-
Douglas production function, f (K ) = AK γ and C R R A form of utility from consumption,
u(c) = c1−θ
1−θ . Following Wirl (1996), the adjustment cost of consumption is represented by a
convex second degree penalty function, 	(κi (t)) = 12ψκi (t)2. We consider the following fairly
standard values for the parameters:
A = 1, ρ = 0.03, θ = 0.8, γ = 0.3,
under which the unique symmetric steady state of the economy reveals: k∗ = 13.4135. Since
the parameter ψ does not affect the level of the unique symmetric steady state, it turns out to be
an ideal bifurcation parameter. Indeed, by Theorem 1, setting ψ = 1.3 × 10−3 yields precisely
one pair of pure imaginary eigenvalues. This pair of purely imaginary roots is important as it
facilitates the existence of limit cycles in the parameter domain of locally unstable spirals for
those parameters that are close to the bifurcation point.6
Some remarks on the existence of limit cycles due to the strategic interaction are in order.
First, it must be noted that the number of agents in the economy does not bring any qualitative
change in the result. Second, it is important to note that complex dynamics emerge even
with the separability of objective function in P ′′′ contrary to the earlier attempts to explain
cyclical patterns (see e.g., Dockner and Feichtinger, 1993). Third, recall that the competitive
equilibrium of the Ramsey model augmented with consumption adjustment costs leads to a
unique asymmetric steady state that is saddle-path sable under these parameter values. This
6Indeed, Hopf bifurcation theorem ensures the existence of limit cycles, if a pair of purely imaginary
eigenvalues exist and if the velocity when crossing the imaginary axis is nonzero. See Guckenheimer and
Holmes, 1983.
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reveals that the initially poor household can never catch up with the rich. However, deviating
from the competitive equilibrium by taking into account the strategic interaction among agents
in the economy not only leads to complex wealth distribution but also complex dynamics as
well. Put differently, the strategic interaction brings out the emergence of Hopf bifurcation that
leads to limit cycles in Ramsey model with consumption adjustment costs. The emergence of
such cyclical patterns of consumption could provide an alternative source for explaining real
business cycles (see e.g., Wirl et al., 2008).
The last but not the least, the importance of these results is further emphasized if one recalls
that sufficiently large consumption adjustment costs may induce complex, in particular, cyclical
policies if there exist positive contributions of capital to utility in an optimal growth framework
(see e.g., Wirl, 1994). However, we show that when households use open-loop strategies rather
than being price takers, complex dynamics may emerge even without capital in utility at very
low levels of adjustment costs. In this respect, we show that structurally very simple frameworks
may lead to limit cycles thanks to the strategic interaction among agents in the economy.
V. CONCLUSION
Considering the strategic interaction among agents changes the qualitative properties of the
standard Ramsey model. In the absence of strategic interaction, the poor will never be able to
catch up with the rich as pointed out in Van Long and Shimomura (2004). However, incorporating
the strategic behavior among agents leads to the wealth level of the two classes to be the same
at the stationary state. Extending the analysis to account for relative wealth concern and the
adjustment cost of consumption, the strategic interaction among agents is shown to lead to a
change not only in the distribution of wealth in the long run but also in the transitional dynamics
substantially. In particular, the strategic interaction leads to the emergence of Hopf bifurcation
that reveals limit cycles in the Ramsey model with consumption adjustment costs.
This paper can be extended to incorporate closed-loop strategies that allow agents to recon-
sider their strategy during the entire game and analyze the long-run distribution of wealth in
terms of catching-up under Markov perfect equilibria.
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